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VIII. JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
A. Introduction
Businesses in Minnesota and throughout the world are rushing
to take advantage of the Internet to advertise goods and services,
unaware of the many legal pitfalls present in this medium of com-
munication. One of these pitfalls is the extent to which a business
utilizing the Internet is subject to personal jurisdiction in Minne-
sota, other states, or other nations. This article surveys four recent
decisions in this area.
B. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.
State ex rel. Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc. ,4 is the first case
in Minnesota to address the issue of whether a foreign defendant
can be held amenable to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota for
1. See Mark Sableman, Business on the Internet, Part I: Jurisdiction, 53J. Mo. B.
137, 137 (1997). Based on twelve 1996 cases addressing Internet jurisdiction is-
sues, Mr. Sableman concludes that the posting of an Internet site in connection
with the active offering of sales of goods or services will probably subject the adver-
tiser to jurisdiction anywhere in the United States where the Internet can be ac-
cessed. See id.
2. See id.; see also Howard G. Zaharoff & Thomas W. Evans, Cyberspace and the
Internet: Law's Newest Frontier, 41 BOSTON B.J. 14, 24-25 (1997).
3. See Sableman, supra note 1, at 137. Jurisdiction concerns for businesses
arise in both criminal and civil cases. See id. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patter-
son, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir. 1996) (trademark infringement and unfair trade
practices); United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 705-06 (6th Cir. 1996) (violation
of federal obscenity statute); Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F.
Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ariz. 1996) (breach of contract, libel, defamation, tortious in-
terference, and violating the Lanham Act); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,
937 F. Supp. 161, 166 (D. Conn. 1996) (trademark infringement); Maritz, Inc. v.
CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1329 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition); Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc.,
939 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (trademark infringement, false designa-
tion of origin, unfair competition, and violations of the New York Anti-Dilution
Statute); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(trademark infringement); Naxos Resources (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Southam Inc., 24
Media L. Rptr. 2265, 2267-68 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (defamation).
4. 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn.
1998).
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transacting business via the Internet with Minnesota residents.5 In-
stead of laying out a clear, concise, jurisdictional framework for
Internet users, the Minnesota Supreme Court completely dodged
this problematic issue with the following order:
Based upon all the files, records and proceedings and,
upon an evenly divided court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the decision of the court of appeals dated September
5, 1997, be, and the same is, affirmed. Dated: May 14,
1998.6
By making this order, the Minnesota Supreme Court missed the
opportunity to clear confusion from its past decisions7 and provide
a clear framework for future Internet related jurisdictional ques-
tions.
1. Facts
Kerry Rogers ("Rogers"), a Nevada resident, is president of
Granite Gate Resorts, Inc. ("Granite Gate"), a Nevada corporation
that conducts business as On Ramp Internet Computer Services
("On Ramp"). 8 On Ramp provided Internet advertising for com-
panies who marketed products directed at the Las Vegas tourist in-
dustry.9 On Ramp also provided advertising for WagerNet, an on-
line wagering service that planned to make on-line gambling avail-
able by the fall of 1995.10 Rogers designed the on-line advertise-
ment for WagerNet and it included a phone number, mailing list,
and an electronic subscription by which people could get more in-
formation." The advertisement also included information on the
gambling service, instructions on how to set up the necessary hard-
ware and software, and discussed the fees that would be charged for
5. No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), aff'd,
568 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
6. Granite Gate Resorts, 576 N.W.2d at 747.
7. See Scott M. Hagel, Civil Procedure-The Stream of Commerce Theory In Minne-
sota: Does the Shoe Fit? In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, 552 N. W.2d 242 (Minn.
1996), 24 WM. MITCHELLL. REv. 231, 251 (1998).
8. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 716-17.
9. See id. at 717. The URL address for On Ramp is http://www.vegas.com.
See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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placing bets." It also provided a warning that the user should con-
sult with "local authorities" before registering with WagerNet. ' In-
terestingly, Rogers set up the gambling service as being based in
Belize, although for all practical purposes operations were to be
run out of Nevada.
14
WagerNet's web page was accessible by a link from the Las Ve-
gas tourist information web page.' 5 It "listed the terms and condi-
tions to which an Internet user assented by applying for the private
access card and the special hardware and software required to ac-• ,,16
cess WagerNet's services. The page noted that any customer
wishing to bring a claim against WagerNet must do so in a Belizian
court.' The page also noted, however, that WagerNet could sue
consumers in their home states to prevent them "from committing
any breach or anticipated breach of this Agreement and for conse-
quential relief."
8
On July 5, 1995, a consumer investigator for the Minnesota At-
torney General's office called the toll-free telephone number dis-
played on an On Ramp site that advertised All Star Sports, a sports
handicapping service, and asked how to bet on sporting events.19The investigator was told to call Rogers.20 The investigator dialed
12. See id.
13. See id.; see also MN Online Scams (visited Aug. 2, 1999)
<http://www.ag.state.mn.us/home/consumer/consumernews/OnlineScams/me
mo.html>. The State of Minnesota posts a warning on its Internet site that states:
Warning to all Internet users and providers. This memorandum sets
forth the enforcement position of the Minnesota Attorney General's Of-
fice with respect to certain illegal activities on the Internet. Persons out-
side of Minnesota who transmit information via the Internet knowing
that information will be disseminated in Minnesota are subject to juris-
diction in Minnesota courts for violations of State criminal and civil laws.
MN Online Scams (visited Aug. 2, 1999) <http://www.ag.state.mn.us/
home/consumer/consumernews/OnlineScams/memo.html>. See generally United
States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing Internet-related personal
jurisdiction issues in criminal proceedings). In Thomas, the Sixth Circuit held that
venue in Tennessee over California defendants was proper given the fact that the
defendants knew that the product they were selling over the Internet was being
transmitted to Tennessee. Id. at 709.
14. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 717.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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the number he was given and spoke with Rogers. 2' The investigator
identified himself as a Minnesota resident who was interested in
placing bets via the on-line gambling service. 2 Rogers told the in-
vestigator how to access WagerNet, that betting with the site was le-
gal, and that the service would hopefully be operational by the
231995 football season.
In July 1995, the Minnesota Attorney General filed a complaint
against the operators of WagerNet, alleging that they had engaged
in deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud
24by advertising in Minnesota that Internet gambling is legal. In
October 1995, by using a fictitious name, the Attorney General's
investigator was put on the WagerNet mailing list and subsequently
received an on-line confirmation stating that he would be sent up-
dates on the WagerNet service. 25 The operators of WagerNet then
26filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, con-
tending that Minnesota computer users must take some affirmative
action to view their on-line advertisements and that the nature of its
21advertisements were passive, not active.
21. See id. The telephone number the investigator was given to call was the
same number to which the WagerNet site directed Internet users to call to obtain
further information about the site. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. Federal law prohibits the interstate or foreign transmission of both
betting information and bets by one engaged in the business of betting or wager-
ing through wire communications facilities, including telephone wires. See 18
U.S.C. § 1084 (1994). Minnesota forbids commercial sports betting. See MINN.
STAT. §§ 609.75, subds. 2-3; 609.755(1); 609.76, subd. 2; and 609.02, subd. 2
(1998). The Attorney General contended that the WagerNet and All Star advertis-
ing in Minnesota explicitly and implicitly represented that betting is lawful. See
Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 717. Therefore, Defendants violated the Min-
nesota Consumer Protection Statutes, which forbid false advertising, deceptive
trade practices and consumer fraud. See id. at 720.
25. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227,
1996 WL 767431, at *4, *9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996).
26. See id. at *1.
27. See id. at *9. Cf Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F.
Supp. 1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that it was irrelevant that a local user
had to "pull" images from a computer in Italy rather than defendant "sending"
them to the United States). The court in Playboy found distribution of trademark
protected images to the United States from a web site in Italy subjected the Italian
defendant to personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1040, 1044.
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2. Ramsey County District Court Decision
The Ramsey County District Court judge allowed limited dis-
covery to determine the quantity and quality of the defendants'
contacts with the state."' Rogers refused to produce the names of
the persons on the WagerNet mailing list, claiming that the infor-
mation was the sole property of a Belizian corporation. 9 Because
the defendants refused to produce the information, the district
court found that as a matter of law, the WagerNet mailing list con-
tained the name and address of at least one Minnesota resident.
30
Thus, the district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss
for lack ofjurisdictioni'
3. Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision, initially finding that Minnesota's long-arm statute1 al-
lowed Minnesota to "assert jurisdiction over defendants to the ex-
tent that federal constitutional requirements of due process
[would] allow."33 The court then applied a five-prong test to de-
termine if minimum contacts existed and whether exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial jus-
tice. 34 The five-prong test requires that Minnesota courts evaluate:
(1) the quantity of the contacts with the forum state, (2) the nature
and the quality of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of
the cause of action with these contacts, (4) the interest of the state
in providing a forum, and (5) the convenience of the parties.'
"The first three factors are of primary importance." 36 In close cases,
28. See Granite Gate Resorts, 1996 WL 767431, at *1.
29. See id. at *5.
30. See id. See also State ex rel. Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568
N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
31. See Granite Gate Resorts, 1996 WL 767431, at *1.
32. See MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1998). The long-arm statute provides in perti-
nent part that "a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may ex-
ercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation or any nonresidential in-
dividual.. . if... the foreign corporation or nonresident individual ... [t] ransacts
any business within the state." Id. subd. 1.
33. Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718 (quoting Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara
Fire Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. 1996)),
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id. (citing Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d
1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983)).
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"doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of jurisdiction."
3 7
The court summarily rejected the defendant's argument that it had
not purposefully availed itself to the privileges of Minnesota and
that assertion of personal jurisdiction would not comport with the
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
a. Quantity of Contacts
In this case, Granite Gate's contacts with Minnesota included
not only on-line communications, but also voice-telephone and
mail communications with Minnesota residents.39 The court found
the quantity of contacts sufficient because the defendant's adver-
tisements were available 365 days a year to any Internet user.40
Moreover, in a two-week period, 248 Minnesota computer users
browsed the defendant's web page. 41 Based on these facts, the
court held that the quantity of contacts were sufficient to meet the
first prong of the five-part test.
42
b. The Nature and the Quality of Contacts
The court then analogized on-line advertisement to broadcast43 444
media, radio," and direct mail solicitation.0 The court stumbled
37. Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 411-12 (Minn.
1992).
38. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718. The court concluded that
submission to personal jurisdiction would not unduly inconvenience Granite Gate.
See id. at 721.
39. See id. at 718-19.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 718.
42. See id. The court erroneously relied on Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947
F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996), to draw this conclusion. The logic of Maritz and
the court's reliance on it are flawed; on-line advertisements are generally passive-
not active as the Granite Gate Resorts and Maritz courts analogize. See infra notes 43-
47 and accompanying text.
43. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718 (citing Tonka Corp. v. TMS En-
tertainment, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 386, 391 (D. Minn. 1985), which held that Minne-
sota can exert personal jurisdiction over a California corporation that produced
television programming that it knew would be broadcast nationwide).
44. See id. (citing BLC Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 359 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985), which held that a Wisconsin corporation's purposeful behavior in ad-
vertising its Wisconsin bar on a Minneapolis radio station such that it should have
reasonably anticipated being haled into a Minnesota court); see also A. Uberti & C.
v. Leonardo ex rel. County of Pima, 892 P.2d 1354, 1362 (Ariz. 1995) (concluding
that because the defendant intended to sell its products to any United States citi-
zen, it could be held accountable in any jurisdiction where its products cause in-
jury).
1140 [Vol. 25
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in its reasoning when it stated, "Internet advertisements are similar
to broadcast and direct mail solicitation in that advertisers distrib-
ute messages to Internet users, and users must take affirmative ac-
tion to receive the advertised product. "46 In fact, the vast majority
of on-line advertisements are passive and require the users to down-
load the information that is simply being stored on a server in a dis-
tant location.47 More importantly, the physical scopes of the other
broadcast mediums are known to businesses. In contrast, the
Internet, while not infinite, is globally accessible and the physical
location of Internet users is generally unknown to businesses.
c. The Source and Connection of the Cause of Action with these
Contacts
The court made a stronger case for the relationship between
the cause of action and the contacts with Minnesota. The decep49Z
tive trade practices violations, false statements in advertisements,
and misrepresentations5 1 made by the defendant were clearly felt by
Minnesota residents. The court relied upon Maritz, Inc. v. Cyber-
Gold, Inc.,52 to conclude that under Minnesota Statutes section 8.31,
subdivision 3, the Attorney General was authorized to seek injunc-
45. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718 (citing State ex rel. Miller v. Bax-
ter Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 1990) (concluding that
Nebraska auto dealers' acts of advertising in Iowa were sufficient to subject them
to suit seeking a halt to the advertisements); Kugler v. Market Dev. Corp., 306 A.2d
489, 491 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973) (stating that direct mail solicitation by for-
eign corporation is sufficient basis for in personam jurisdiction); State v. Colorado
State Christian College, 346 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (concluding
that defendants' acts of sales, solicitation by mail over period of five months, and
shipment of product constituted business within the state for purposes of jurisdic-
tion); State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 501 P.2d 290, 302 (Wash. 1972) (holding
that mailing for purposes of increasing subscriptions and sales satisfies the mini-
mum contacts requirement)).
46. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 720; see also Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc.,
372 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a corporation cannot avoid juris-
diction by hiding behind the structure of the distribution system when it intended
to enter the market and profit thereby).
47. There are two possible explanations for the Granite Gate court's error on
this point. The first is that it simply did not understand the inner workings of the
Internet and the mechanics by which messages are transmitted. A second less al-
truistic reason is that the court simply wanted to find jurisdiction in this case and,
thus, it whitewashed this point.
48. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 720.
49. See MINN. STAT. § 325D.44, subd. 1 (1998).
50. See id. § 325F.67.
51. See id. § 325F.69, subd. 1.
52. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
1999]
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tive relief and civil penalties when satisfied that any of the con-
sumer statutes allegedly violated in this case "is about to be vio-
lated.""3
d. The Interest of the State in Providing a Forum
The court's strongest argument is that for public policy rea-
sons, the Attorney General's office has a strong interest in enforc-
ing consumer protection statutes and regulating gambling in Min-
nesota. The Attorney General's office clearly could not sue Granite
Gate in either Nevada or Belize.54 Therefore, in order to give
meaning to the State's consumer protection laws, the court rea-
55soned in favor of finding personal jurisdiction. Although this ar-
gument is very strong for the Attorney General's claims, a clear fac-
tual distinction should be made for future cases dealing with non-
governmental entities.
e. The Convenience of the Parties
Finally, the court found that because WagerNet had reserved
the right to sue Minnesota residents in Minnesota as part of the
business agreement, the defendants' argument that it was burden-
some to defend in Minnesota was without merit.56 The court cited
the United States Supreme Court decision in Hanson v. Denckla 7 to
reinforce its argument that defending in a foreign tribunal was less
burdensome due to increased technology, communications, and
58transportation.
After weighing these five factors, the court determined that
53. Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 720. The phrase "about to be violated"
raises an interesting constitutional question as to the ripeness of the Attorney
General's claim in this case. See id. The facts are clear that although Granite Gate
was going to offer on-line gambling services, it had yet to start. See id. at 717.
54. See id. at 721; State ex rel. Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d
888, 892 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 501
P.2d 290, 303 (Wash. 1972) (holding that Washington courts had jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant that advertised there, and noting that "[i]f our courts are not
open, the state will be without a remedy in any court and the Consumer Protec-
tion Act will be rendered useless").
55. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 721.
56. See id.
56. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
58. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 721 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-
51). In reality, this entire prong is of minimum significance in this case. The
"convenience of the parties" argument can be made by both the plaintiff and de-
fendant, especially when the plaintiff is as sophisticated as the State of Minnesota.
1142 [Vol. 25
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Minnesota's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Granite Gate
would be constitutional and comport with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'
The Granite Gate court recognized that determining the extent
to which Internet communications may affect a nonresident defen-
dant is not easily ascertainable. 60 While the Granite Gate court util-
ized a traditional minimum contacts analysis as a starting point, the
court also broke new ground. It had to consider when contacts
via the information superhighway required a nonresident defen-
dant to defend itself in a forum in which they have purposefully
made cyberspace contact.
The Granite Gate court reached the right decision because the
defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of using the
Internet to reach Minnesota residents. 62 Moreover, because of the
Attorney General's interest in protecting Minnesota residents,63 the
decision is proper. But, although the Granite Gate court reached
the correct decision, its reasoning was flawed. The court should
have decided Granite Gate under a World-Wide Volkswagen analysis.64
Instead, it chose to analogize Internet advertising with traditional
65media forms of print, radio, and television.
The court erred in its reasoning when it analogized the Inter-
net to traditional types of media 66 due to the significant difference
in the scope of the target areas of these mediums. On the Internet,
the scope of the targeted area is rarely known. The Internet adver-
tiser simply loads his advertisements into a server and customers
59. See id.
60. See id. at 718-21. See generally Craig Peyton Gaumer, The Minimum Cyber-
Contacts Test: An Emerging Standard of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction, 85 ILL. B. J.
58 (1997) (discussing the sufficiency of "cyber contact").
61. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718-21; see also Gaumer, supra note
60, at 62-63 (analyzing CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)
and Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). In
some cases when the cause of action is closely related to the Internet communica-
tion, cyberspace contacts should be enough, standing alone, to satisfy minimum
contacts test. See Gaumer, supra note 60, at 63.
62. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
63. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 721.
64. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(stating that that in order for a forum state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, the defendant's "conduct and connection with the forum State...
[must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there").
65. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 719-20.
66. See id. at 720; see also Bauman, infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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access that server through phone lines. In contrast, customers of
traditional media forms take active roles in pushing their message
out to consumers via paper or radio waves allocated to them on a
bandwidth. In short, the traditional media forms are active while
Internet advertising is passive. Therefore, because the court failed
to recognize the basic differences between these two communica-
tion forms, the reasoning in the Granite Gate decision is tenuous.
However, the Granite Gate decision is significant because it is
the first case in Minnesota to rule that Internet contacts within
Minnesota can be sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements
of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.67 The Minne-
sota Court of Appeals recognized that the Internet is a communica-
tion medium that lacks historical parallel in the potential extent of
its reach and that regulation across jurisdictions may implicate
fundamental First Amendment concerns.r
The Granite Gate court also noted that it will take time to de-
termine the precise balance between the rights of those who use
the Internet to disseminate information and the powers of the ju-
risdictions in which receiving computers are located to regulate for
the general welfare. 69 In making its decision, the court tried to
67. See Bauman, infra note 106 and accompanying text. See also U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause).
68. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718. However, in doing so, the
court analogized the Internet to mail solicitation (State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n.,
Inc., 501 P.2d 290, 302-03 (Wash. 1972)); newspapers, television and telephone
book advertising (State ex rel. Miller v. Baxter Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 456 N.W.2d
371, 376-77 (Iowa 1990)); and radio advertising (BLC Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 359
N.W.2d 752, 754-55 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)). Id. at 719-20. In a specific jurisdic-
tion case involving national broadcasting, the federal district court in Minnesota
upheld the exercise of specific jurisdiction where the defendant's sole contacts
with Minnesota were the airing of national television programs which were carried
by local American Broadcasting Corporation affiliates in Minnesota. See Tonka
Corp. v. TMS Entertainment, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 386, 390-91 (D. Minn. 1985)
(transferring the case because it found that although personal jurisdiction existed,
proper venue did not). See also U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting free speech).
69. Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718. Federal courts considering the
issue of personal jurisdiction and Internet contacts have concluded in several cases
that the solicitation of business via the Internet can subject a nonresident defen-
dant to personal jurisdiction. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996); see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that operating a web site is sufficient
to establish minimal contacts for personal jurisdiction); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruc-
tion Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (concluding that Internet
advertising is designed to communicate with people in every state and, therefore,
advertiser could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being haled into any state
court); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding
1144 [Vol. 25
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limit its decision to the facts of this case and stay within the pa-
rameters of established legal principles.0 The concern is that the
holding in Granite Gate will be expanded beyond these facts and
used in future Internet cases in Minnesota with an even more ex-
pansive approach to deciding personal jurisdiction issues.
The court of appeals based its decision in part on Internet
cases from other jurisdictions with considerably different facts than
those in Granite Gate.7' A comparison of these cases to other similar
Internet cases demonstrates the convoluted nature of personal ju-
risdiction in this area in Minnesota and across the nation.
C. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.
In Maritz, Inc., v. CyberGold, Inc.,72 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found personal jurisdic-
tion over California defendants who maintained a web site adver-
tisement.73 The Maritz court utilized the same five-factor analysis as
did the Granite Gate court and rationalized that because 131 Mis-
souri residents had accessed the defendant's web site, the defen-
dant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in Missouri:
[The defendant] has consciously decided to transmit ad-
vertising information to all [I]nternet users, knowing that
such information will be transmitted globally. Thus, [the
defendant's] contacts are of such a quality and nature, al-
beit a very new quality and nature for personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence, that they favor the exercise of personal ju-
personal jurisdiction where solicitation of donations occurs through the web site
and through newspaper advertising).
70. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 721.
71. See id. at 718-21.
72. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
73. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
74. See id. See also Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C., v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp
413, 422 (D. Ariz. 1996). In Edias, the court denied a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction filed by a nonresident software producer, in an action
brought by a former distributor, alleging among other things, libel, breach of con-
tract, and defamation broadcast over the Internet. Edias, 947 F. Supp. at 417. The
court applied the Ninth Circuit's three-part test for specific jurisdiction: (1) de-
fendant must perform some act by which he avails himself of the privilege of doing
business in the forum; (2) the claim must arise out of the defendant's forum-
related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. See id.
The court found that the defendant's Internet activities, including e-mail, web
sites, and an Internet forum, constituted a basis for personal jurisdiction. See id.
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risdiction over the defendant.7 5
In arriving at its decision, the Maritz court found that trade-
mark infringement was a tortious act in Missouri, thus (providing a
basis for personal jurisdiction under state statutory law. The court
rejected the notion that on-line advertising is "passive" advertise-77
ment. Instead, the court viewed the web site as an "active" contact
with Missouri, akin to the defendant mailing a letter to a Missouri
resident in response to a query by mail from that resident. 1
The Maritz court erred in rejecting the defendant's argument
that on-line advertisement is passive in nature. The defendant did
violate trademark infringement rights, but in no way did it pur-
posefully avail itself to the laws and protections of Missouri.
Moreover, it was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that it
would be haled to court in Missouri. Because of these fatal flaws,
the Granite Gate court should not have relied upon the Maritz deci-
sion.
D. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.79 involved a trademark
infringement suit brought in the federal district court in Connecti-
cut. Although the Granite Gate court relied on Inset for support,
the Inset facts are distinguishable from those in Granite Gate because
the defendant's contacts with the forum state consisted solely of its
web page."
The district court in Inset addressed the jurisdictional issue by
inquiring into whether the defendant's conduct of supplying a web• • ,82
page on the Internet satisfied Connecticut's long-arm statute andthe minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause of
75. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. The court also noted that individuals in Missouri had accessed the
defendant's site 131 times (not counting the 180 times that the plaintiff accessed
the site), amounting to a significant quantity of contacts. See id. Transmitting in-
formation through each of those "hits" showed purposeful availment of the privi-
lege of doing business in the state, and justified personal jurisdiction. See id.
79. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
80. Id. at 162-63.
81. See id. at 162-63 (stating that the defendant neither employed employees
in the forum state nor conducted business in the forum on a regular basis).
82. See id. at 163 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411 (c) (2) (repealed 1997)).
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the Fourteenth Amendment.83 The Inset court reasoned that the
defendant, by the very nature of the World Wide Web, "had been
continuously advertising" in Connecticut and therefore had solic-
ited in a "sufficiently repetitive nature to satisfy... Connecticut['s]
long-arm statute."s4
The Inset court determined that Internet solicitation is even
more pervasive that other forms of advertising.8 5 Unlike television
and radio, in which advertisements are broadcast at certain times
only, or newspapers in which advertisements are often disposed of
quickly, the court stated that advertisements on the Internet are
available to Internet users continually, at the stroke of a few keys of
a computer. Based on this "contact" with the state, and on the
proximity between the forum and defendant's headquarters in
Massachusetts, the court found that the elements of due process
were met for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction."'
The Inset court then addressed the issue of "minimum con-
tacts" by first inquiring into whether the defendant "reasonably an-
ticipated being haled into court" in Connecticut s and then by de-
termining whether "maintenance of the suit in the forum state...
offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 9
The court held that due process was satisfied because the defen-
dant reasonably could have anticipated being haled into court in
Connecticut since it had "purposefully availed itself of the privilege• 90
of doing business within Connecticut" through its web page. Fur-
83. See id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
84. Id. at 164.
85. See id.
86. See id.; see also Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C.
1996) (exercising jurisdiction based on defendant's solicitations via its Internet
home page and an advertisement in the Washington Post).
87. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164.
88. Id. at 165. In reaching this conclusion the court compared the facts in
Inset to Whelen Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Tomar Elecs., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 659 (D. Conn.
1987). See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164. The court in Whelen found that the defen-
dant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum
state where it had advertised and had "provided products on order." Whelen, 672
F. Supp. at 664. The court in Inset reached the same conclusion upon finding that
the defendant, like the defendant in Whelen, had made its advertisements available
continuously to any interested person. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165. The court in In-
set did not address the fact that its defendant, unlike the defendant in Whelen, had
not sold any products in Connecticut. See id.
89. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164; see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring minimum contacts within the territory of the
forum state to satisfy the due process requirement).
90. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant was
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ther, the court reasoned that maintenance of the suit did not of-
fend traditional "notions of fair play and substantial justice"9' be-
cause the defendant resided near Connecticut and the state had an
92interest in adjudicating the dispute.
Again, the Granite Gate court's reliance on Inset is dubious be-
cause Inset bases its reasoning on the premise that on-line advertis-
ing is active rather than passive in nature. Also, the mere act of ad-
vertising on the Internet does not mean that a defendant
purposefully avails itself of the laws and protections of Connecticut.
Thus, the Granite Gate court should not have relied on Inset for its
decision.
E. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger
Although not mentioned in the Granite Gate opinion, the deci-
sion in Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,93 a New York case involving trade-
mark infringement over an Internet domain name, is informative
in its logical approach to solving Internet personal jurisdiction
problems. In Hearst, the. U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York ruled that mere ownership of a web site that is ac-
cessible to, and visited by, New York computer users does not con-
stitute sufficient contacts with that state to provide its courts with
personal jurisdiction over the web site owner. 9 The court in its rul-
ing stated:
Where... a defendant has not contracted to sell or actu-
ally sold any goods or services to New Yorkers, a finding of
personal jurisdiction in New York based on an Internet
web site would mean that there would be nationwide (in-
deed, worldwide) personal jurisdiction over anyone and
everyone who establishes an Internet web site. Such na-
tionwide jurisdiction is not consistent with traditional per-
less than two hours away and had retained counsel in Connecticut. See id. The
state had an interest in adjudicating the dispute because the action concerned is-
sues of Connecticut law. See id. The court mentioned all five considerations to be
analyzed under Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985), but ad-
dressed only two of them. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
91. Id.
92. See id. The action was based on a violation of the Federal Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. See id. at 162.
93. No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
94. See id. at *12. See also Current Development, Web Site Does Not, by Itself, Give
New York Court Personal Jurisdiction, 14 COMPUTERL. 28 (1997).
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sonal jurisdiction case law nor acceptable to the Court as a
matter of policy.
°s
Concededly, the Hearst case is distinguishable from Granite Gate
because the New York long-arm statute does not reach as far as the
Minnesota long-arm statute.9 However, aside from this difference,
the New York court expressly declined to follow Maritz and Inset.97
In both Maritz and Inset, jurisdiction was found to be appropriate
simply because the defendants decided to make advertising avail-
able to Internet users, thereby, theoretically at least, purposefully
availing themselves of the privilege of doing business in the forum
state.98 The New York court in Hearst stated that these decisions
were tantamount to declaring that every court throughout the
world may assert jurisdiction over all information providers on the
World Wide Web.9  Worldwide jurisdiction would have a stifling
impact on the use of the Internet and ultimately on businesses that
use it.'0° In the absence of a specific congressional instruction cre-
ating national jurisdiction over Internet content providers, the
magistrate in Hearst declined to adopt such a broad theory of juris-
diction.''
Hearst relied upon other cases where federal courts had held
that the mere creation of a web site that could be accessed from
any state was not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction.'02 In one
of these cases, Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,3 the court held
that creating a web site was "like placing a product into the stream
95. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *l.
96. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (1) (McKinney 1990) (enumerating acts
which constitute the basis for personal jurisdiction under New York's long-arm
statute) with MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1998) (enumerating acts which are the basis of
Minnesota's exercise of personal jurisdiction under its long-arm statute).
97. See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *20.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at *7.
102. See id. at *13, *16; Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. 95-4037, slip
op. (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1996). For example, Bensusan involved a dispute between
the owners of a popular New York jazz club, "The Blue Note," and Richard King,
the owner of a small jazz club in Missouri that had the same name. Bensusan, 937
F. Supp. at 297. In April 1996, the defendant posted a site on the World Wide
Web to promote his club. See id. The court dismissed the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction. See id. at 299.
103. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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,,104of commerce .... Its effects could be "felt nationwide or even
worldwide - but, without more, it is not an act purposefully di-
rected toward the forum state."'1 5 Based on this clear analytical
thinking, the Granite Gate court should have relied on the reason-
ing of the Hearst and Bensusan opinions instead of that found in
Maritz and Inset.
F Summary
Granite Gate is Minnesota's first of what undoubtedly will be
many struggles with reconciling the concept of a boundless cyber-
space with the antiquated notion that a sovereign exercises power
within fixed borders.0 6 While the decision in Granite Gate was ap-
propriate, the court's reasoning is fundamentally flawed. The
court's errant assumption in Granite Gate is that on-line advertising
is a more purposeful contact with a particular forum than is printS• 107
advertising. Anyone in the world can access almost all on-line ad-
vertisements. With print, television, or radio advertising, the adver-
tisers generally know the scope of who is receiving the solicitation.
In trying to subject these different communication forms in the
same manner, courts are forced to concoct a legal fiction that
Internet advertisers intend to avail themselves of the benefits and
of the laws of every jurisdiction on Earth.108
In the future, Minnesota courts deciding Internet related deci-
104. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301. The "stream of commerce" concept takes
on a new dimension in the context of web sites which make computer software
available for downloading by simply accessing the web site. See Bauman, infra note
106 and accompanying text. Only one reported case addresses whether making
software available for downloading from the Internet is a sufficient contact to war-
rant personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at
*3.
105. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
106. See Lori Irish Bauman, Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Advertising, 14
COMPUTER L. 1 (1997). Ms. Bauman argues that the differences in recent deci-
sions are a result of two separate schools of thought. See id. at 6. The first views
the Internet as a continuous and pervasive advertising mechanism whereby the
advertisers have purposefully availed themselves to every forum where their infor-
mation is downloaded. See id. The second views the Internet as a more passive
medium, dependent on the actions of local residents to bring it within the state.
See id. This author subscribes to the second approach and advocates that Minne-
sota courts should also adopt this second approach in future cases.
107. See id. at 3-6.
108. See id. However, Ms. Bauman points out that personal jurisdiction is al-
ways going to be restricted by the requirement that the claim must arise out of the
Internet contact. See id. at 5.
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sions must be careful to rule that simply advertising on the Internet
does not subject defendants to personal jurisdiction. °9 If simply
posting an advertisement on the Internet is eventually determined
to be sufficient contacts, Minnesota will be creating a nation-
wide/world-wide jurisdiction."'
Todd Matthew Phelps
109. See id. at 6.
110. See id.
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